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Abstract 
The introduction situates the ‘hard problem’ in its historical context and argues 
that the problem has two sides: the output side (the Kant-Eccles problem of the 
freedom of the Will) and the input side (the problem of qualia). The output side 
ultimately reduces to whether quantum mechanics can affect the operation of 
synapses. A discussion of the detailed molecular biology of synaptic 
transmission as presently understood suggests that such affects are unlikely. 
Instead an evolutionary argument is presented which suggests that our 
conviction of free agency is an evolutionarily induced illusion and hence that 
the Kant-Eccles problem is itself illusory. This conclusion is supported by well-
known neurophysiology. The input side, the problem of qualia, of subjectivity, 
is not so easily outflanked. After a brief review of the neurophysiological 
correlates of consciousness (NCC) and of the Penrose-Hameroff microtubular 
neuroquantology it is again concluded that the molecular neurobiology makes 
quantum wave-mechanics an unlikely explanation. Instead recourse is made to 
an evolutionarily- and neurobiologically-informed panpsychism. The notion of 
an ‘emergent’ property is carefully distinguished from that of the more usual 
‘system’ property used by most dual-aspect theorists (and the majority of 
neuroscientists) and used to support Llinas’ concept of an ‘oneiric’ 
consciousness continuously modified by sensory input. I conclude that a 
panpsychist theory, such as this, coupled with the non-classical understanding 
of matter flowing from quantum physics (both epistemological and scientific) 
may be the default and only solution to the problem posed by the presence of 
mind in a world of things. 
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‘It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible,  
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth’ 
 




The problem of mind or, in modern 
phraseology, the ‘hard problem’, has very 
deep roots in Western culture.  It was, 
however, only sharply exposed by the 
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scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
century.  Galileo sought to deflect 
ecclesiastical anger by insisting that whilst his 
science was far preferable to its Aristotelian 
competitor in accounting for the things of this 
world, the things of the spirit were best left 
to ‘a higher science than ours’.  René 
Descartes in a similar spirit of reconciliation 
sharply distinguished an immaterial ‘mind’, 
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res cogitans, from a material body, res 
extensa, where his hydraulic physiology 
obtained.  But these attempts to escape 
ecclesiastical censure necessarily failed.  The 
question was inevitably asked: where do 
mind and matter interact?  Descartes pointed 
to the pineal.  This, of course, only led to the 
next question: how? 
 Brain science has travelled an 
immense distance since the seventeenth 
century.  Yet, as many have remarked, the 
basic understanding of the brain as a material 
system has not altered.  Similarly our basic 
self-understanding has not altered.  We 
understand ourselves as free agents and we 
understand ourselves to be conscious beings, 
subject to pains and pleasures, colours, 
sounds, odours, tastes and all the other 
‘qualia’ of everyday living.  The problem 
posed by the seventeenth century has not 
withered away, as have so many others, but, 
if anything, has become starker. 
 There are thus two parts to the ‘hard 
problem’: the output part, i.e., how can we 
reconcile our conviction that we are free 
agents with the iron laws of determinism 
which (seemingly) control the workings of the 
brain; and, secondly, the input part, i.e., how 
can we reconcile the varied qualia we ‘live 
through’ daily with the material substratum 
of the brain?  It has often been said that the 
problem is insoluble within the framework of 
classical, post-seventeenth century, science.  
As indicated above this science originated in a 
sharp and purposeful exclusion of 
consciousness.  It is thus hardly a surprise 
that no way can be found to account for it 
within its contemporary lineal successor. 
 There was, however, as we know, a 
revolutionary departure from classical physics 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.  It 
was found that the concepts derived from the 
seventeenth-century revolution, the concepts 
of Descartes, Newton and many others, were 
inapplicable to the world of the very small.  
Indeed the founding fathers of this post-
classical physics, quantum physics, saw no 
way of proceeding without bringing in the 
consciousness of the observer – anathema to 
classical physics.  It consequently occurred to 
a number of these revolutionaries that we 
might have here a fresh and viable approach 
to the mind-matter problem of 
neuropsychology (Smith, 2006). 
 Many have observed that modern 
neuroscience is fully within the mechanistic 
paradigm first promulgated by René 
Descartes in L’Homme and elsewhere 
(Huxley, Woodger, Blakemore etc.).  As such 
it must, at some level, be open to quantum 
effects.  Where could this be, and could it 
provide a solution to the ‘hard problem’ of 
the relation of mind and brain?  Two major 
answers to this question have been 
proposed: the synapse and the microtubule.  
 
2. Synapses 
Our understanding of synapses has increased 
hugely since the term was coined by 
Sherrington in the 1890s.  They are now 
recognised to be organelles of immense 
biochemical and molecular biological 
complexity, so much so that they form the 
subject matter of an entire journal, Synapse, 
published monthly as well as figuring largely 
in many other neuroscientific publications.  
As Lisman, Raghavachan and Tsien (2007) 
remark, there are nowadays specialists who 
devote their research careers to one side of 
the synaptic cleft and others who direct their 
careers entirely to the other!  The depth of 
our understanding has increased hugely since 
Sherrington’s time and also since the early 
1990s when Beck and Eccles published his 
final papers on NeuroQuantology (Beck, 
2008; Eccles, 1990; 1994; Beck and Eccles, 
1992). 
 Eccles’ objective was to save human 
agency from the seemingly iron laws of 
physical determinism.  It was an objective 
very similar to that which motivated 
Immanuel Kant in the Critiques he published 
at the end of the eighteenth century.  It will 
be remembered that engraved upon his 
tombstone was the problem with which he 
had tussled all his life, how to reconcile the 
Newtonian determinism of ‘the starry 
heavens above’ with the subjective 
conviction of free agency necessary for ‘the 
moral law within’.  
 Why synapses? The Sherrington-
Eccles tradition in twentieth-century 
neuroscience teaches that the flexibility of 
the brain resides in its synapses.  The axons 
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and dendrites of the brain, the perikarya and 
the glial cells, are all regarded as part of the 
‘hard-wiring’.  They may, and certainly do, 
change, grow and decline, throughout life but 
the millisecond changes underlying willed-
decisions can only be changes in synaptic 
transmission.  Let us, then, look at the 
contemporary neurobiology of the synapse. 
 There are, of course, immense 
numbers of synapses in the human brain: 
some estimates suggest in excess of 100 
billion (1011-1012).  In strong contrast to the 
junctions found in silicon-chip computers 
they differ hugely, one from another.  Indeed 
it can be safely said that no two synapses out 
of these 100 billion are identical.  They differ 
in size, in position on the post-synaptic cell, in 
transmitter substance used, and in a 
multitude of other ways.  Some inhibit 
activity in the post-synaptic cell, others excite 
activity.  In addition some synapses do not 
use transmitter substances at all but act 
directly on the post-synaptic cell by electrical 
transmission. This, then, is the first problem 
presented by the synapse to the 
NeuroQuantologist.  Are all, or just some, of 
this multifarious crowd of synapses involved 
in quantum responses?  Presumably it is just 
some, those involved in the output pathways 
underlying voluntary activity.  But these 
output pathways are, of course, many and 
varied.  Some precede to the vocal apparatus, 
some to the limbs, some to other bodily 
parts.  How does the ‘Will’ select which 
synapses to actuate? 
 But supposing these initial difficulties 
are overcome, we come next to the synapse 
itself.  Most, if not all NeuroQuantologists 
who suspect the synapse to be the locus of 
quantal interaction, assume that it is the 
chemical rather than the electrical variety 
that is subject to these effects.  Chemical 
synapses are, as already mentioned, many 
and various.  However, because of their small 
size and other difficulties, few synapses in the 
mammalian central nervous system have 
been subjected to detailed biophysical 
investigation. One which has proved 
particularly useful is the calyx of Held, a giant 
glutaminergic synapse in the mammalian 
auditory brain stem.  Much of what is known 
of the fundamental biophysics of chemical 
synapses has been determined by using this 
preparation.  Other large synapses are made 
by mossy fibers in the Cornu Ammonis region 
of the hippocampus and these, too, have 
proved invaluable to synaptologists.  
 The initial event in synaptic 
transmission at chemical synapses is the 
arrival of an action potential at the 
presynaptic terminal.  This opens P/Q-, N- 
and R-type Ca2+ channels in the terminal’s 
membrane.  These channels differ in the 
pharmacological blocking agents which affect 
them and in susceptibility to modulation by 
G-proteins etc.  Nevertheless their overall 
structure is much the same.  They consist of a 
tetramer of sub-units grouped around an ion 
channel.  An X-ray crystallographic solution to 
a type example of a K+-channel (the bacterial 
KcsA channel) was achieved by MacKinnon’s 
lab, first at a 3.2Å resolution and then at 2Å 
resolution (Doyle, 1998).  It provided a deep 
insight into the structural biophysics of this 
first step in synaptic transmission.  The KcsA 
channel resembles an inverted wigwam with 
its base projecting on the extracellular side of 
the membrane and its apex projecting 
intracellularly. The selectivity pore is 12Å in 
length and some 3Å in diameter at the apex 
of the wigwam.  The pore opens and closes 
by movement of the α-helical walls at the 
base of the cone.  In the closed position the 
α-helical pores are closely apposed to each 
other.  As the amino-acid residues projecting 
from the α-helix are only about 4Å apart and 
are hydrophobic, the pore is effectively 
closed to small hydrophilic cations. But how is 
this movement caused by change in voltage 
across a membrane? The next step was, 
therefore, to crystallise and analyse a 
voltage-gated K+-channel. When this was 
done, also by MacKinnon’s lab, it was shown 
that the central ion-conduction pore is 
surrounded by voltage sensitive ‘paddles’ 
which move in response to voltage changes 
across the membrane, opening and shutting 
the pore into the extracellular compartment 
(Jiang et al, 2003).   
 Ca2+-channels are, in essence, four K+-
channel subunits joined together.  There is 
thus every reason to believe that the means 
of connecting voltage change across the 
membrane to the opening of the channel is 
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analogous to that discovered in the K+-
channel tetramer.  Ca2+ moves through the 
selectivity channel via two binding sites: a 
low affinity site near the extracellular 
entrance and a high affinity site further down 
the selectivity channel.  When a Ca2+ ion 
arrives at the low affinity site its electrostatic 
field displaces the Ca2+ on the high affinity 
site which then, provided the pore is open, 
tumbles into the interior.  The through-put in 
physiological conditions is very high.  Ca2+ 
channels are clustered around synaptic 
vesicles in the presynaptic terminal.  The 
arrival of an action potential thus opens a 
small group of these channels and Ca2+ pours 
into a ‘microdomain’ (diameter about 
200nm) surrounding a vesicle.   In central 
glutaminergic synapses it has been found that 
the Ca2+ concentration in the microdomain 
surrounding a synaptic vesicle rises to 
between 10μM and 25μM  for some 300μsec 
after the opening of the Ca2+ gates is 
triggered, i.e. between 2.5 and 63 x 1010 Ca2+ 
ions are released into the 200nm 
microdomain.  After the Ca2+ channel closes, 
Ca2+ rapidly diffuses out of the microdomain 
and is sequestered elsewhere in the terminal. 
 Ca2+ ions bind to synaptotagmin 
sensors on vesicle membranes.  Four to five 
such cations bind to a synaptotagmin 
molecule and activate it in a co-operative 
fashion.  Each vesicle membrane presents 
about fifteen synaptotagmin molecules to the 
Ca2+ microdomain.  They act together with a 
whole complex of other molecules – SNAREs. 
VAMPs, SNAPs etc. to bind the vesicle 
membrane to the interior leaflet of the 
terminal membrane and cause the vesicle to 
shed its contents – neurotransmitter – 
through a 1-2 nm fusion pore into the 
synaptic cleft.  The formation of this fusion 
pore is still not fully understood.  It is, 
however, clear that a complex biochemistry is 
involved.  This is still being worked out and 
fortunately need not concern us in this paper 
(Smith 2002; Jackson and Chapman, 2006; 
Lisman et al., 2007). 
 
3. Can Quantum Fluctuations Influence 
Synaptic Exocytosis? 
Although at first Eccles believed that 
quantum fluctuations could affect the 
synaptic vesicle directly, he quickly realised 
that the numbers were against him and that 
any such phenomena would be quickly 
swamped by thermal agitation. 
NeuroQuantologists have subsequently 
looked at two places where quantum physics 
may affect the synapse – at the exocytotic 
fusion pore itself and at the Ca2+-channel 
responsible for triggering the exocytotic 
process.  In his last papers Eccles focused on 
the ‘synaptic grid’ which is visible in 
electronmicrographs of the interior of the 
presynaptic membrane.  He collaborated with 
the quantum physicist Friedrich Block and 
argued that ‘preparation for exocytosis 
means bringing the paracrystalline 
presynaptic grid into a metastable state from 
which exocytosis can occur’ (Beck and Eccles, 
1992). In his 1996 paper Beck discusses the 
quantum feasibility in detail although 
emphasising that it is the biophysics not the 
philosophical problem he is treating (Beck, 
1996).  Another twelve years of research into 
the molecular biology of synaptic excocytosis 
has shown, as indicated above, that the 
model envisaged by Eccles must be replaced 
by a far more complex biochemistry. It is 
difficult to see where quantum fluctuations 
would affect this more complex biochemistry 
in any significant way and thus affect the 
probability of exocytosis. 
 If quantum events cannot affect the 
intricate process of transmitter release 
perhaps they can influence the Ca2+ trigger 
for that release.  This has been suggested by 
several quantum physicists including Henry 
Stapp. Stapp observed that at their narrowest 
point the Ca2+ channels are no more than 1 
nm wide and that this would give a lateral 
uncertainty of about 1% of the ion’s 
longitudinal velocity (Stapp, 2004, p.25).  
This, writes Stapp, affects the probability of 
the Ca2+ ion being absorbed on the triggering 
site on the presynaptic terminal. ‘The 
quantum state of the brain’ write Schwartz, 
Stapp and Beauregard (2005, p.11) ‘has a part 
in which the neurotransmitter is released and 
another part in which it is not released.  This 
quantum state occurs at every one of the 
trillions of terminals’.  It is this ‘smear’ of 
possible quantum brain states which 
consciousness probes and ‘reduces’ from 
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‘potential’ to ‘actual’.  Unfortunately, as we 
noted above, the Ca2+ channel opens at the 
base of the ‘wigwam’ to a width considerably 
more than 2 nm and four or five Ca2+ ions 
bind co-operatively to each of some fifteen 
synaptotagmin sensors before vesicle 
exocytosis is triggered.  Stapp’s theory is, in 
other respects, very interesting and includes 
as a central part the ‘quantum Zeno’ or 
‘watched-pot’ effect which would, as he says, 
for the first time provide a place for 
consciousness in evolutionary theory (Stapp, 
2004, p.30).  However, as I have argued more 
fully elsewhere (see Smith, 2008), neither the 
Eccles/Beck nor the Stapp endeavours to find 
a locus for quantum fluctuations to make 
themselves felt in the molecular biology of 
the brain seem to me to take adequate 
account of  the neurobiological reality 
revealed in recent research.     
 
4. Another Approach to the Free-Will 
Problem 
If the Kant-Eccles problem of free-will in a 
Newtonian universe is recalcitrant to solution 
by the new physics of Bohr, Heisenberg and 
Schrödinger can an alternative be devised?  
Let us look at a solution proposed by 
evolutionary biology. 
 Evidence based on mitochondrial 
DNA suggests that modern humans 
originated some 200.000 years ago on the 
savannahs of East Africa. Communication 
must have been at the centre of this early life 
style.  Palaeoanthropologists tell us that they 
probably foraged in small bands of from 50 to 
75 individuals.  Hominids possessed neither 
the athleticism nor the natural weaponry of 
their fellow predators and prey.  Co-operative 
tactics must have been the rule. Active 
hunting, scavenging, collecting would all have 
been group endeavours. Teaching, learning, 
imitation must have been at an evolutionary 
premium.  This is reflected in the brain.  Not 
only does the FOXP2 ‘language’ gene show 
signs of strong evolutionary pressure over the 
last 200.000 years but the mirror neuron 
system in human brains is also very well-
developed. This system provides a 
neurophysiological basis for imitative 
learning, for empathic understanding and 
also, it is argued, for the origin and evolution 
of natural language (Rizzolatti and Criaghero, 
2004). 
 These developments all point toward 
the development of a ‘theory of mind’.  
Indeed, there is evidence that some infra-
human primates also show rudiments of such 
a theory.  All humans, however, with the 
possible exception of some extreme autistics, 
recognize the existence of ‘minds’ in other 
humans and sometimes attribute them to 
several other species of animal. Indeed 
primitives attribute ‘minds’ to phenomena 
which we would regard as inanimate. They 
might attribute ‘intentionality’ to lightning 
and thunder, to inundations and the skeins of 
bird flight. Once such attributions are made, 
once the behaviour of other members of the 
band is understood as the outcome of 
emotions and passions similar to those one 
experiences oneself, the world changes.  
Living in a close-knit band, once it is 
recognized that others resemble oneself, one 
quickly attributes to others the motives and 
intentions one feels oneself.  Vice-versa one 
feels the gaze of others on oneself.  Self-
consciousness emerges. The ego, as 
sociologists following George Herbert Mead 
argued long ago, is socially generated. 
  But in order to hold the group 
together, to survive on the open savannah, 
members of the band have to behave in a co-
operative manner. How can this be ensured?  
Ethologists have examined the methods used 
by many social species to achieve co-
operative behaviour (Wilson, 2000) but the 
Hominidae solved the problem in a unique 
way: by developing a deontic system based 
crucially on the supposition that other 
members of the band were ‘free’ agents, that 
they were, in other words, responsible for 
their actions. Once this was allowed the 
powerful attributes of praise and blame could 
be applied. Only within such an ethical 
framework could reciprocal altruism develop 
so that individuals in a band felt ‘obliged’ to 
act in a co-operative manner. Only in this way 
could the band survive the perils of the 
savannah. The band would fall apart if its 
members were unable to ‘praise’ or ‘blame’ 
their fellows, if its members did not regard 
each other as ‘responsible’ for their actions, 
if, in a word, they were not regarded as ‘free’. 
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Thus it can be seen that evolutionary 
pressures during the long ages of prehistory 
ensured that the notions of freedom and 
responsibility became deeply embedded at 
the core of the human psyche.  
 But if this is so, the balance of 
argument shifts towards accepting that our 
conviction that we are free agents is no more 
than an illusion.  Indeed, the argument for 
illusion is strongly supported by 
neurophysiological studies such as those of 
Benjamin Libet (1999) which imply that 
consciousness comes late on the scene of a 
seemingly willed action.  Perhaps Thomas 
Huxley was right when he described humans 
as ‘conscious automata’!  This does not, 
however, mean that we are ‘zombies’.  It 
does not mean that if we are told we are 
going to do something, we willy-nilly do it.  It 
is only when the information is withheld from 
the agent that the hidden onlooker can 
predict. I have described this as the 
psephelogical argument (Smith, 1993).  If the 
voter is told what the result of an election is 
going to be this information changes his 
voting behaviour.  Similarly, if an individual is 
told what his future action is going to be this 
alters the complex of neurophysiological 
forces within his brain so that an earlier 
prediction is invalidated. 
 It seems to me, therefore, that the 
Eccles-Stapp effort to discover a gap in the 
iron law of physical determinism is not only 
neurobiologically questionable but also 
misconceived.  There is no problem posed by 
the existence of the moral law in a 
deterministic universe: freedom of the will, 
however profoundly felt, is an evolutionarily 
ingrained illusion. Thus there is no need to 
delve into the recesses of synaptology to find 
loci where quantum mechanics could take 
hold. 
 
5. The Problem of Qualia 
The problem posed by the presence of qualia 
in a world of things is, however, not so easily 
solved. This, as mentioned in the 
introduction, is the second part of the ‘hard’ 
problem.  The ‘easy’ part (better the ‘tough’ 
part) is identifying which activity in which 
part of the brain is associated with 
consciousness, in other words identifying the 
neural correlatives of consciousness (NCC).  
The first decade of the twenty-first century 
has seen a huge upsurge of interest in 
identifying these correlates. Numerous 
different ideas have been proposed (see 
Smith, 2008) but none have as yet received 
universal consent. Nevertheless, many 
investigators of the NCC have provided 
evidence that coherent oscillatory activity in 
the cortex underlies several forms of 
consciousness (Llinas et al, 1998 for review). 
In particular widespread γ-band activity (30-
70 Hz oscillations) is correlated with many 
conscious states. 
 This oscillatory activity has been 
correlated with quantum mechanics by the 
well-known work of Stuart Hameroff and 
Roger Penrose (Penrose, 1989; 1994; 
Hameroff and Penrose, 1996). In essence 
they propose that self-collapse of coherent 
quantum states spreading through quite large 
populations of neuronal microtubules creates 
states of consciousness.  Each such collapse 
creates a conscious moment. Hameroff and 
Penrose calculate that the self-collapse of a 
coherent quantum state associated with 
microtubules connected through some 
20.000 neurons would account for 
oscillations at γ-band frequencies.  
Consciousness thus consists of a rapid 
succession of conscious moments: some 40 
every second. The Hameroff-Penrose 
conjecture has been subjected to fierce 
criticism from the quantum physics 
community (Tegmark, 2000; Siefe, 2000) and, 
as with the quantum synaptology discussed 
above, seems hardly to accord with 
contemporary molecular neurobiology 
(Smith, 2008).  Most importantly, however, it 
is not obvious how the self-collapse of 
coherent quantum states is associated with 
the qualia we live through day by day.  
Penrose’s original proposal pointed to the 
similarity between the ‘non-computability’ of 
quantum ‘self-collapse’ and mathematical 
intuition, not with the day to day subjectivity 
of the common man. 
 Nevertheless, in spite of the seeming 
incompatibility of the Penrose-Hameroff 
conjecture with conventional understandings 
of quantum theory, molecular neurobiology 
and the varying shades of human subjectivity, 
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it may be that it will find a place in some 
future theory of the brain-mind. Roger 
Penrose remarks from his Platonic 
perspective that ‘the currently fashionable 
picture of the brain and mind is a mere 
shadow of the deeper level of cytoskeletal 
action – and it is at this deeper level where 
we must seek the physical basis of mind’ 
(Penrose, 1994, p.376). 
 
6. Panpsychism 
It all depends on what one means by 
‘physical’. We noted in the introduction that 
the seventeenth century scientific revolution 
based itself on a sharp distinction between 
matter and mind (or soul). It was only thus 
that science could escape ecclesiastic control 
and theological censure. The old Aristotelian 
science of four causes, of movement from 
potential into actual, and of a triune or 
tripartite soul –vegetable, animal and rational 
– all that great system of thought fell away 
into desuetude and was ultimately forgotten.  
Yet for a millennium and a half it had formed 
the science of the day.  It fell into desuetude 
because the new science of Galileo and his 
followers proved a far better description and 
thus tool for manipulating the natural world. 
 Yet the ultimate outcome of Galilean 
science, after four hundred years of research, 
has shown, at least according to the orthodox 
Copenhagen interpretation, that 
consciousness cannot be excluded from our 
account of the natural world.  Although, as I 
argued above, it does not seem likely that 
quantum physics, or through quantum 
physics, consciousness can affect the brain’s 
microphysiology and thus, by a multiplication 
up through layers of complexity, human 
choice, nevertheless the allusions to 
consciousness in the works of the great 
founding fathers of the subject (see Smith, 
2006) perhaps points a way forward.   
 Is it possible, finally to reconnect 
mind, that is ‘experiencing’, the presence of 
‘qualia’, of ‘subjectivity’, with matter through 
a rapprochement between quantum physics 
and the often derided thesis of panpsychism?  
Amongst quantum physicists, David Bohm, 
whose ideas have recently received 
something of a second coming, certainly 
thought so (Bohm, 1990).  Panpsychism, as 
David Skrbina’s recent book (Skrbina, 2005) 
has emphasised, has always had a following 
in Western thought.  La Mettrie provides an 
example.  Because of the title of his major 
work, L’Homme Machine, he is often 
regarded as the supreme materialist.   In fact 
he is the complete opposite (Smith, 1999):  
He regarded Descartes’ mechanistic 
physiology as a joke (‘Descartes that genius 
made to open up new paths and lose his way’ 
1747, p.138; ‘There is nothing in the whole 
Universe but a single diversely modified 
substance, 1747, p.117, etc.).  Examples could 
be multiplied (Skrbina, 2005).  Essentially the 
panpsychist believes that mentality has been 
part of the world, from the beginning (see 
Smith, 2000) - that matter has, in other 
words, and to quote David Bohm once more, 
‘a mental pole’.  This idea has struck many as 
absurd.  Yet, as the quotation which heads 
this paper suggests, ‘when you have excluded 
the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth’ 
 Can we make sense of this 
proposition?  It is surely absurd to say that 
sticks and stones and thermostats feel! This is 
only commonsense. Consciousness is 
restricted to animate forms.  Some would, of 
course argue that commonsense is not a 
good guide.  For many centuries it was only 
common sense to believe that the Sun 
revolved around the Earth.  Common sense 
was spectacularly wrong.  But let that pass.  
Let us suppose that consciousness is 
restricted to animate creation and indeed to 
animals and animal brains. How can we 
reconcile the panpsychist belief in 
consciousness as a fundamental feature of 
the universe and the conviction that it is 
restricted to animal brains and, perhaps, the 
brains of ‘higher’ animals at that?  What’s so 
special about brains?  
 One possible answer is ‘material 
complexity’. Brains are commonly said to be 
the most complex concatenations of matter 
in the known universe (for discussion see 
Smith, 1994).  But they are more than merely 
intricate constellations of matter; they are 
also profoundly unified. They show a 
property that Denbigh (1975) defines as 
‘integrality’ to an unparalleled degree. The 
figures are well known. Human brains contain 
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well over 1010 neurons and each receives 
anything up to 100 000 synaptic contacts on 
its dendritic tree and soma. This is quite 
different from organs of comparable size, 
such as the liver.  Here the cells may be in 
vascular contact with each other but have no 
direct and rapid contact through action 
potentials and/or electrotonic conduction.  
Changes in any one part of the brain are likely 
to elicit changes in every other part. 
 Brains are also quite different in this 
regard from their silicon competitors. 
Remove a circuit from a computer, or a line 
of code, and disaster promptly ensues.  They 
do not, as the jargon has it, degrade 
‘gracefully’. Although their wiring diagrams 
may approach those of more primitive brains 
in complexity their units are inorganic and 
burnt into the silicon. This is not how it is 
with brains. The complexity does not stop at 
the level of neurons but continues all the way 
down to the molecular and atomic level, as 
noted in section 2 above. Aquinas explains 
the difference nicely when he writes that ‘a 
natural body is distinguished from an artificial 
body in that in the former the component 
parts lose their individuality whereas in the 
latter, like bricks in a wall, their individuality 
is maintained’ (Aquinas, 1274, book 4, §35) 
 Quantum physics, as we have noted, 
disabuses us of the notion that atoms and 
molecules fall under the Newtonian rubric of 
‘solid, massy, hard, impenetrable Particles’.  
Stick and ball models of molecules do great 
disservice in forming the intuition of budding 
biochemists and molecular biologists. Linus 
Pauling showed us long ago that the covalent 
bonds uniting atoms in the simplest 
molecules involve the sharing of electrons; 
quantum physicists showed even earlier that 
the notion of electrons, or indeed atoms, 
having a precise location has to be 
abandoned. The common picture of the 
microworld as consisting of a swarm of 
miniscule billiard balls bouncing into and 
against each other could hardly be further 
from the truth. Rather than organisms and 
brains being built, stone on stone like some 
great cathedral, they are generated by the 
‘flickering’ unification of their constituents. It 
is difficult for the mind bought up under the 
widespread influence of outmoded science to 
grasp this reality. In a previous paper (Smith, 
2008), I noted that Nietzsche, in the 
nineteenth century, had had a premonition of 
this pervasive error in Western thought.  In 
many places and in particular in The Will to 
Power he points out that for thinkers in the 
Western tradition ‘in order to think and infer 
it is necessary to assume ‘beings’; logic only 
handles formulae of what remains the same’ 
(1883/8, §517). He believed that the old 
‘essentialist’ metaphysics was no more than a 
deeply embedded fiction allowing the ‘naked 
ape’, Homo sapiens, to survive and prosper 
on the Sun’s third planet (see, also, Smith, 
1987; 1992). This belief, he maintained, 
‘however necessary it may be for the 
preservation of the species has nothing to do 
with the truth…’ (Nietzsche, 1883/8, §487). 
 Thus one possible way of reconciling 
the panpsychist thesis of mentality ‘all the 
way down’ with our conviction that 
consciousness is only to be found in animals, 
and perhaps only the so-called ‘higher’ 
animals, is to make use of the concept of 
emergence.  This, of course, is a not 
uncommon move and one made by many 
thinkers who would be inclined to rubbish 
panpsychism. These latter thinkers argue that 
consciousness is the property of brains much 
as time-keeping is a property of clocks.  
Consciousness no more inheres in the 
elements of which a brain is composed than 
time-keeping inheres in the elements – the 
cogwheels, the spring, the escapement etc. – 
which make up a clock.  But put all the 
elements together in the appropriate fashion 
and consciousness springs out of the one as 
time-keeping springs out of the other. The 
panpsychist will have nothing to do with this 
concept of emergence: consciousness is not a 
property like time-keeping, or, in the 
computer-analogy, computation. These 
properties, argues the panpsychist, are 
‘system-properties’, not true emergent 
properties. 
 The sense in which the panpsychist 
wishes to use emergence is that given in the 
Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language: ‘to come forth into view or notice, 
as from concealment or obscurity – a ghost is 
emerging from the grave; a ship emerging 
from the fog…’ (for further discussion see 
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Smith, 1983).  This can be formalized as 
follows: ‘Let “x” be a complex entity and “P” a 
property possessed by “x”; then “P” is an 
emergent property of “x” iff it is present but 
undetected in some or all the components of 
“x”’. A number of examples may serve to 
make this concept of emergence clearer. 
 One of the most interesting of these 
is gravity itself. The gravitational force 
between subnuclear particles is 36 orders of 
magnitude less than the predominating 
Coulombic forces.  It is not detectable by 
contemporary physical instrumentation.  Yet 
when these subnuclear particles aggregate 
into atoms and these into stars and planets, 
gravity emerges as the dominating force in 
the universe. 
 It is much the same with the short-
range forces between nucleons.  Karl Popper 
(1947) points out that these forces are not 
detectable between the ‘free-living’ nucleons 
of intergalactic space. Yet when nucleons are 
crushed together by huge stellar pressures so 
that they come to within 10-15 m of each 
other, these forces are ‘unveiled’. They then 
become supremely important in holding 
together the atoms of which the Universe 
(including ourselves) is composed.  
 Finally, as temperatures approach 
0oK, quantum effects normally swamped by 
thermal statistics emerge into the 
macroscopic, human, world as the 
phenomena of superconductivity and 
superfluidity etc.  
 These are all examples drawn from 
the world of physics. They all show that 
characteristics possessed but undetected by 
components of the microworld emerge into 
the macroworld in appropriate 
circumstances. 
 A note of caution is appropriate here.  
All the physical properties of the microworld 
itemized above could in principle be detected 
by utopian physical instrumentation: they are 
all physical properties, all in principle 
measurable.  This, of course, is not the case 
with mentality.  Qualia, as Descartes insisted 
in the seventeenth century, have no spatial 
or massive dimensions. So the examples of 
emergence given above are at best analogies, 
crutches to help show what the panpsychist 
has in mind. 
 For the panpsychist would argue that 
consciousness, like quantum indeterminism, 
is a fundamental feature of the universe and, 
like quantum indeterminism, is in most cases 
swamped out by the thermal statistics of the 
macroworld.  Only in certain highly peculiar 
cases, when the conditions are just right, 
does it ‘emerge’ into the macroworld.  These 
cases, as I argued above, are provided by the 
huge integrated complexity of animal 
(including human) brains. 
 
7. The Different Forms of Qualia 
The panpsychist argument outlined in the 
previous section ends by suggesting that 
although qualia are basic constituents of our 
universe they only become significant in the 
unprecedented integral complexity of animal 
brains. This argument, of course, implies that 
subjectivity has no evolutionary advantage: it 
is just a ‘brute’ fact’. This, of course, seems 
counter-intuitive and, indeed, objectionable 
to many, especially, perhaps, to those rose in 
the humanities where the study of human 
subjectivity, whether expressed in literature, 
music or painting, is all-important. But this 
may be merely our ineluctable bias towards 
self-importance, towards anthropocentric 
views of the world.  Darwinists might, on the 
other hand, express some satisfaction.  It has 
never been obvious what part, if any, 
subjectivity has, or can play, in the ‘random 
variation and selective retention’ which 
powers evolution by natural selection.i. 
 It cannot be denied, however, that 
qualia differ throughout our waking lives and, 
indeed, in dreaming sleep.  If subjectivity is 
the outcome of the integrated outcome of 
activity in large volumes of cerebral material, 
according to William James of the entire 
brain (James, 1890), then why should pain, 
scents, tastes, views, sounds, ‘feel’ so very 
different? This problem is compounded when 
we recognize that the material substrate, the 
cerebral microstructure and microphysiology, 
at the subcellular and molecular level, is 
largely indistinguishable.  This is not to say, of 
course, that the brain areas to which the 
special senses project are not distinctively 
different from each other – the visual areas, 
auditory areas, olfactory areas in the 
mammalian brain have been well mapped – 
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but that they all have much the same 
underlying molecular biology. 
 The best answer to this conundrum 
is, I believe, that proposed by Llinas and Paré 
some years ago (Llinas and Paré, 1996).  
Llinas conceives that an ‘oneiric’ 
consciousness, perhaps associated with 
phase-locked oscillations in wide areas of 
neocortex, palaeocortex and thalamus, is 
continuously modified by sensory input 
(Llinas et al., 1998).  An image is provided by 
the different so-called Chladni figures 
induced by different vibrations in a thin layer 
of sand on a metal tray. A similar metaphor is 
provided by the different vibrations, and 
consequently different musical tones, 
engendered by closing the different stops of a 
wind-instrument such as a flute. 
 This take on the mind-brain problem 
is clearly a version of the dual-aspect thesis 
implicitly accepted by most neuroscientists.  
It implies that a certain pattern of activity in 
the brain – the whole brain in this case – is 
‘experienced’ as a certain quality of 
subjectivity.  There is, of course, a huge 
amount of evidence – experimental, 
pathological etc. – that this is the case.  What 
is new in the panpsychist thesis is that these 
qualia are modifications of an underlying 
consciousness, an oneiric consciousness (to 
use Llinas’s graphic description), which is just 
a ‘brute’ consequence of the brain being the 
intricate integral system, all the way down to 
the submicroscopic, that it is.  It suggests that 
a computer system which might respond in 
precisely the same way as the brain responds 
would, if built ‘from the outside’ with 
inorganic units – perhaps dustbin lids to use 
John Searle’s example - would not 
experience, or live through, the subjectivities 
we, conscious, creatures live through. It 
suggests, also, that our conviction that we are 
persons, responsible for our actions, is, as 
hinted in section 4, illusory.  This, as both 
Nietzsche (Nietzsche 1883/8: §485) and 
Bohm (1987), suggest is one of the most 
difficult, if not the most difficult, implication 
to accept.  It may be the consequence that 
the Holy Office intuited four hundred years 
ago when Copernicus and Galileo destroyed 
the medieval synthesis. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Thus, to sum up, it seems to me that the 
focus on synaptology by quantum physicists 
in an endeavour to preserve freedom of 
action in a material world (Kant’s problem) 
does not mesh with what molecular biologists 
now understand about those multitudinous 
junctions between neurons. I would also 
argue that the microtubular alternative 
promoted by Penrose and Hameroff, latterly 
especially by Hameroff, also fails to pass the 
test of molecular plausibility.  I would argue, 
instead, with MacKay (1967), that freedom of 
action is illusory except when the agent is 
told from the outside of his future behaviour.  
The conviction we all have that we act out of 
free will is a deeply embedded adaptation to 
the sociality enforced on early humans during 
the long age of the Pliocene. 
 The existence of qualia, of 
subjectivity, is, however, it seems to me 
inescapable.  How subjectivity can be tied 
into the world in which we find ourselves 
remains the major intellectual problem of our 
time.  I suggest that the panpsychist position 
is not only not absurd but requires serious 
consideration and I give a brief and 
necessarily overly compact account of how it 
might be developed in the light of 
contemporary neuropsychological 
knowledge. I suggest, in addition, that the 
insights both physical and philosophical of 
quantum theory (according to many a 
calculating device giving no information 
about ontology) assist this approach. 
Whether this route out of our difficulties is 
viable or whether it leads to such unpalatable 
conclusions that it must be rejected I leave 
others to judge. I can only end as I began, 
with the great detective’s words of wisdom; 
‘when you have excluded the impossible, 
whatever remains, however improbable, 
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